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The Republic of Korea achieved universal health coverage based on social health insurance in 1989. Before
the merger of statutory health-insurance funds in 2000, health insurance in the Republic of Korea was
fragmented and consisted of more than 350 quasi-public insurance funds (societies). There were three types
of health insurance fund: for employees, for the self-employed, and for school and public employees. The
insured were assigned to insurance funds based on workplace (for employees) or residential area (for the self-
employed). Before the merger, many health insurance funds for the self-employed in rural areas experienced
serious financial distress. 
Gaps in fiscal status between urban and rural (or between rich and poor) insurance funds widened over the
years. Furthermore, differences in the method of setting contributions and in the amount of contribution
across insurance funds raised concerns about equity in contribution payment. Members of insurance
societies in poor or rural areas had to contribute a greater proportion of their income, as compared to those
in wealthy areas. 
This study examines the merger of statutory health-insurance funds in the Republic of Korea. Based on a
political- economy approach, it examines the context, main players, policy process, and impact of the policy
reform. It will determine whether the merger achieved its objectives, such as improving the exercise of
purchasing power of the insurer, savings in administrative costs, and improvement in equity in contribution
payment. 
The study will also identify key factors associated with the positive and negative impacts of the policy
change. Because healthcare reform is inherently political, the role of key players associated with the merger
will also be examined. The debate involving the issue of a single fund versus multiple funds has continued
since the inception of health insurance in the Republic of Korea. The role of competition among stakeholders,
including labour unions and civic groups, was also crucial in the reform of the merger. 
The study will examine the challenges that the health-insurance system of the Republic of Korea faces even
after the merger, such as the limited exercise of purchasing power by the single insurer and differential
contribution-setting for employees and the self-employed. Following the merger, the health-insurance
system of the Republic of Korea now has two agencies: the National Health Insurance Service (NHIS) and
Health Insurance Review and Assessment (HIRA). The functional division of the single insurer into two
agencies resulted from the politics of the reform process. The final section of the study will provide other
countries with lessons learnt from the reform experience of the Republic of Korea.
INTRODUCTION
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PATHWAYS TO THE MERGER OF STATUTORY
HEALTH-INSURANCE FUNDS IN THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA
2
2.1 Historical development of the health-insurance system in the Republic of Korea
The Government of the Republic of Korea mandated health insurance first for employees, and then extended
coverage to the self-employed. Employees of large businesses with more than 500 workers were the first
group to be covered by health insurance in 1977; health insurance was then incrementally extended to
employees of smaller corporations.
In 1988, the self-employed in rural areas joined the health-insurance system, and universal population
coverage was achieved in 1989 by coverage of the self-employed in urban areas (Figure 1). Rapid economic
growth in the seventies and eighties, and political legitimacy sought by the military and authoritarian regime,
contributed to the rapid extension of population coverage.1 From the beginning, health insurance in the
Republic of Korea consisted of insurance funds based on employment (for employees) or residential area (for
the self-employed).2
1 Some key economic and health indicators for the Republic of Korea are presented in the Annex.
2 See Kwon, 2009, for details.
Figure 1. The road to universal coverage
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Source: Kwon, 2009.
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The extension of health insurance to the self-employed elicited fierce debates concerning institutional
arrangements for the universal health-insurance system. The discussions centred upon whether self-employed
health insurance should adopt the then-pluralistic approach of multiple insurance funds or, alternatively, if a
new single-insurer system should be created by merging with existing insurance funds for employees. 
Through nationwide risk-pooling, the single-insurer system would have the potential benefit of a smooth
extension of health insurance to the self-employed, with better prospects of fiscal sustainability. However,
the difficulty in assessing income and collecting contributions from the self-employed was a potential barrier
to a single-insurer approach. (The social consensus held that the self-employed should pay premiums based
on the capacity to pay, just as employees did.)
Proponents of the merger maintained that the huge surplus of employee health-insurance funds could be used
to extend insurance to the self-employed. As of 1997, the accumulated surplus of employee health-insurance
funds totalled more than 113% of one year’s health expenditure, while that of self-employed insurance funds
was only 30% of one year’s expenditure. Parliament, supported mainly by rural residents, passed the law on
the merger of employees and self-employed insurance funds, but the President vetoed the law. The
Government, especially the Ministry of Finance, wanted to keep the existing approach of multiple insurance
funds (mainly to minimize the Government’s role in healthcare financing). 
2.2 Structure of the health-insurance system before the merger of statutory insurance funds 
Before the merger of statutory health-insurance funds into a single insurer in July 2000 (universal coverage of
the population was achieved in 1989), the national health-insurance system consisted of multiple not-for-
profit insurance funds, which were subject to rather strict regulation by the Ministry of Health and Welfare
(MOHW). 
There was no competition among insurance funds to enrol the insured, and each fund covered a well-defined
population group. Except for the review and assessment of claims submitted by providers, health-insurance
funds did not actively exercise their purchasing power and there was no selective contracting with providers. 
There were three different types of health insurance fund: 
ñ health insurance for employees and their dependants (36.0% of the population); 
ñ health insurance for school and Government employees and their dependants (10.4%); and 
ñ health insurance for the self-employed (50.1%), which was also called regional health insurance (Table 1). 
As of 1998, the Medical Aid programme for the poor, which was funded from the Government’s budget,
covered the remaining 3.5% of the population. In 1998, there were 227 insurance funds for the self-employed
(92 in rural and 135 in urban areas), which were established in subdistricts of the city. There were 142 funds
for employees and a single (nationwide) insurance fund for school and Government employees. 
1988 1989 1990 1995 1999 2000 2001
Total 33 196 44 168 44 110 45 429 46 821 47 466 47 882
Health insurance 28 906 39 922 40 180 44 016 45 184 45 896 46 379
Employee Subtotal 22 129 20 982 20 759 21 559 21 717 22 404 23 167
Insured 6 966 6 479 6 511 7 166 6 803 7 268 7 885
Depen-dants 15 163 14 503 14 247 14 393 14 914 15 136 15 281
Self-employed Insured 6 777 18 940 19 421 22 457 23 467 23 492 23 213
Medical Aid 4 290 4 246 3 930 1 413 1 637 1 570 1 503
Source: NHIC, Health Insurance Statistics in various years.
Table 1. Number of insured for three types of health insurance fund
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All insurance funds provided the same statutory benefits package to enrollees and the same reimbursement
to healthcare providers. (Healthcare providers face the same financial incentives regardless of which insurance
fund covers patients.) Contributions to self-employed funds were calculated based upon income, property,
and household size, whereas contributions to employee funds were based only on wage income. Each
insurance fund set their contribution rate within the range established by the Ministry of Health and Welfare.
The Government was worried that some providers did not want to join the health-insurance programme due
to tight fee scheduling. Rather than contracting with providers, the Government mandated that all medical
providers treat insured patients. 
The Government provided a subsidy only to insurance funds for the self-employed, intending to cover
administrative expenses and part of the contributions of the lower-income group. This subsidy was provided
because of the limited capacity to pay experienced by the self-employed, although the Government was not
the employer for the self-employed. Over time, the Government increased the subsidy to self-employed
insurance funds – although health expenditure increased at a faster rate and so the proportion of Government
subsidy in the total revenue of self-employed funds has decreased ever since its introduction. In 1988, the
relative share of the Government subsidy in the revenue of the insurance funds for the self-employed was
44.1%, which decreased to 25.6% in 1998 (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Source of health-insurance revenue for the self-employed
This table is from Kwon, 2003a, p.79.
Source: National Health Insurance Corporation, Health Insurance Statistics, various years. 
Contribution Government subsidy Revenue sharing Others
A decrease in the role of the Government subsidy in health insurance resulted in an increase in contributions
by the self-employed. As the ability to pay in rural areas was limited, many insurance funds for the self-
employed suffered chronic fiscal deficits. 
In response, the Government introduced a risk-sharing mechanism (designated the Fiscal Stabilization Fund)
to reallocate contribution revenues across all insurance funds based on catastrophic medical expenses and
population structure (that is, the proportion of elderly people) in each insurance fund. 
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Self-employed 9 121 12 144 13 200 3 861 14 521 15 508 17 918 22 449 25 619
Public and school 11 393 12 586 13 855 12 816 13 834 14 339 15 263 16 205 18 359
employee
Employed 7 598 8 790 9 949 10 884 11 840 13 165 14 831 16 253 17 374
Self-employed 2.9 3.06 3.27 3.58 3.71 4.2 4.6 4.93 4.82
Public and 3.67 3.75 3.96 4.27 4.44 4.93 5.43 5.83 6.16
school employee
Employed 3.33 3.41 3.57 3.92 4.07 4.48 4.88 5.15 5.54
Self-employed 103.16 75.06 82.09 89.24 93.11 107.37 114.04 105.48 104.46
Public and 84.32 72.53 78.61 92.82 95.03 105.96 126.84 132.01 146.6
school employee
Employed 81.82 72.14 71.93 76.21 77.29 82.86 90.11 93.21 111.62
* Contribution paid by the employee, excluding the portion paid by the employer.
Source: NHIC, Health Insurance Statistics for various years.
Average 
monthly 
contribution 
per person*
(100 million Won)
Number of
outpatient 
visits 
per person
Benefit/
contribution
(%)
Table 2. Key characteristics of three types of health insurance
2.3 Efficiency and equity concerns in the system of multiple insurance funds3
Inequity in premium contributions and the fiscal deficits of many health-insurance funds for the self-employed
were the major concerns, which resulted in the merger of statutory insurance funds. Before the merger,
health-insurance funds used different methods of setting contributions for employees and the self-employed.
The definition of earnings for the contribution base also differed across employee insurance funds. For
instance, the contribution base in some insurance funds for employees included base salary only, while others
were based on total compensation. Differences in the method of setting contributions – despite identical
statutory benefits packages – caused horizontal inequity across insurance funds. In other words, people with
the same ability to pay contributed different premiums, depending on the insurance society in which they
were (mandatorily) enrolled.
Differences in medical-care utilization existed across insurance funds – utilization was highest in school-
employee and public-employee funds and lowest in self-employed funds (Table 2, above). These differences
resulted from variability in the age structure – there was a larger proportion of elderly people among the
dependants of school-employees and public-employees. Lower incomes among farmers and the regional
maldistribution of healthcare providers also contributed to lower healthcare utilization in the self-employed
funds in rural areas.
For the members of self-employed insurance funds in poor areas, the burden of their contribution as compared
with their capacity to pay, was greater than for those in more prosperous regions. As a result, many self-
employed insurance funds in rural areas experienced serious fiscal deficits. The aforementioned revenue-
sharing mechanism among insurance funds failed to rescue rural health-insurance funds from fiscal instability,
because it was largely a structural problem. 
3 This section is a substantially revised version of Kwon, 2003a.
Revenue-sharing mechanisms benefitted health-insurance funds for the self-employed (particularly in rural
areas) although it failed to alleviate their financial insolvency. As of 1998, the relative share of revenue from
the Fiscal Stabilization Fund in the total revenue of self-employed insurance funds was 10.9% – down from
13.6% in 1997 (NHIC, 1999). Some key characteristics (such as contributions and healthcare utilization) of
the three health-insurance schemes are presented in Table 2.
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Rural areas experienced a decrease in population size, but with an increased proportion of elderly people
health-insurance funds in those regions faced increasing health expenditure while their members’ ability to
pay remained minimal. There was a growing concern that gaps in fiscal status between urban and rural (or
between rich and poor) insurance funds threatened social solidarity and fiscal sustainability of the national
health-insurance system.
Before the merger, many health-insurance funds were too small in size to pool their financial risks efficiently.
The absence of competition did not encourage insurance funds to merge for the purpose of improving their
capacity for pooling risks. Many small insurance funds could not benefit from economy of scale in
management, and proponents of the merger maintained that it would, to a great extent, save administrative
costs of the health-insurance system. The proportion of administrative costs in the total expenditure was
lowest (4.8%) in the single insurance fund for school and Government employees and highest (9.5%) in
health-insurance funds for the self-employed (NHIC, 1999).
In the system of pluralistic insurance funds, decentralized decision-making had the potential to better meet
the healthcare needs of members. However, self-governance of insurance funds was rarely realized in the
Republic of Korea. The ruling political party and the Ministry of Health and Welfare often had an influence on
the appointment of the chief executive officers of insurance funds. Some of them were former military
personnel, persons closely affiliated with political parties, and former bureaucrats retired from government.
Health-insurance funds were also subject to heavy regulation by the MOHW. The insured did not participate
in the major decision-making of their insurance funds, although the strong role of the Government
contributed to the rapid extension of population coverage, a uniform statutory benefits package, and a tight
fee schedule for providers.
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A change in politics and a new president of the Republic of Korea opened the window of opportunity for the
major policy change towards the merger (Kwon & Holliday, 2007). The new President, Kim Dae-Joong, had a
progressive political ideology and a keen interest in social-welfare policy. Politicians who had their
constituents in rural areas supported the merger to maximize votes from farmers enrolled in self-employed
health insurance funds. Farmers, the urban poor, and the workers (officers) in self-employed health-insurance
funds were strong supporters of the merger. 
3.1 Government
From the beginning, the Government wanted to minimize its fiscal input into the health-insurance system.
The military regime of the seventies and eighties was reluctant to mobilize fiscal resources away from the
economic sector and towards social development. In addition, the Government worried that, in a single-
insurer system, fiscal instability of health insurance would call for a direct Government subsidy. The
Government believed that self-governance in the pluralistic health-insurance system would minimize the
demand for Government involvement in financing. As a former leader of democratic movements in the
Republic of Korea, President Kim Dae-Joong was very keen on social solidarity and believed that the single-
insurer system was more equitable and better for social solidarity. He had included the merger of
health-insurance funds in the agenda of his presidential election campaign. Members of Parliament from rural
areas, regardless of their party membership, were supportive of the merger because they believed that it
would solve the problem of chronic fiscal deficits in rural health-insurance funds.
3.2 Labour unions
Organized labour played a relatively minor role in the introduction and extension of health insurance in the
Republic of Korea. Labour unions became active only in the late eighties, and many of them were based in
large enterprises (firm-based rather than industry-wide labour unions), which were enjoying employment
security and fringe benefits. However, increased unionization in small firms and huge layoffs due to the
economic crisis in the late 1990s caused labour unions to pay increasing attention to social policy and safety
nets (Kwon, 2001). The labour union of workers (officers) in self-employed insurance funds supported the
merger, while those in employee insurance funds opposed it.5
Both labour unions represented to some extent the interests of the enrollees in their respective health-
insurance funds. Employees were not supportive of the merger as it would increase their contributions – their
income being easier to assess and the income of the self-employed believed to be underreported.
Furthermore, the merger would provide a better and nationwide career path for those working in the funds for
the self-employed. Before the merger, health-insurance funds for the self-employed were small and localized,
with little rotation of personnel.
POLITICS AND ACTORS ASSOCIATED 
WITH THE MERGER OF STATUTORY 
HEALTH-INSURANCE FUNDS IN THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA4
3
4 This section is a substantially revised version of Kwon, 2003a. 
5 The labour union of self-employed health-insurance funds and the labour union of employee insurance funds were affiliated with
different federations. The former is under the “Korean Confederation of Trade Unions” (KCTU), usually regarded as more radical; and
the latter is under the “Federation of Korean Trade Unions” (FKTU). 
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3.3 Academics and civic groups 
Progressive academics in the fields of social welfare and public health supported the single-insurer system,
whereas liberal academics who favoured decentralization and market competition preferred the system of
multiple insurance funds. Progressive groups viewed multiple health-insurance funds as preserving inequality
of socioeconomic status and class, harming social solidarity. The progressive academics had strong coalitions
with progressive civic groups, farmers’ associations and the labour union of self-employed health-insurance
funds. Those progressive groups developed the discussion on the organization of the health-insurance system
into social movements towards social-policy reform for solidarity. As a strong ally of the new President, they
became deeply involved in the policy process of the merger and other healthcare reforms.
3.4 Self-employed
The extension of health insurance to the self-employed in the late eighties faced difficult challenges. Farmers
in particular refused to pay contributions and requested major reforms such as discounted contributions,
change in the method of setting contributions (based only on earnings rather than on both earnings and
property), increase in the Government subsidy, and the expansion of healthcare facilities in rural areas. 
In the late eighties, farmers’ organizations led protests and formed coalitions with other supporters of health-
insurance reform. They later believed that the merger of their insurance funds with those for employees and
those in rich urban areas would solve many of the problems that their insurance funds faced, including chronic
fiscal deficit. Protests by farmers, which were initially motivated by the economic burden of contributions,
developed into the movement towards the merger of health-insurance funds, with the support of progressive
academics and civic groups. 
3.5 Employers and employees
Major employers supported the system of multiple insurance funds because they expected to have an
influence over the management of the accumulated surplus from firm-based insurance funds (Kim, 1989).
Employees and their employers were opposed to the merger because they worried that the difficulty of
income assessment of the self-employed would result in a cross-subsidy (from employees to the self-
employed) and an unfair economic burden on employees. 
However, due to the economic crisis, which called for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue loan in
the late 1990s, employers had to focus more on economic issues such as structural adjustment and
employment issues. As a result, employers did not have a strong voice in the policy process – although they
were a potential stumbling block in the merger process. 
3.6 Medical-care providers
Medical-care providers did not actively participate in the policy process of the merger. Compared with the
system of multiple insurance funds, a single insurer would have greater purchasing power, potentially
threatening provider autonomy. In terms of purchasing, however, the multiple funds already had single
purchasing based on uniform provider payment and benefits packages along with centralized claim review. 
The merger had a potential benefit in that the single-insurer system could solve the fiscal insolvency of rural
health-insurance funds. This was good news for medical providers, particularly in rural areas. Providers were
more concerned about the pharmaceutical reform that separated prescribing by physicians from dispensing by
pharmacists, which led to nationwide physician strikes (Kwon, 2003c).
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4.1 Merger 
In order to improve the efficiency and equity of health insurance, the National Assembly passed a law to
merge insurance funds into a single fund. In October 1998, the health-insurance funds for the self-employed
and for school and Government employees were merged to create the National Health Insurance
Corporation (NHIC). In July of 2000, employee health-insurance funds were merged (administratively) into
the NHIC, and national health insurance in the Republic of Korea changed to a single-insurer system.
However, the merger of financing took place two years later than the administrative merger. As a result of
the merger into a nationwide single pool, the single insurer applied a nationwide contributions schedule for
the insured. 
4.2 Health insurance agencies
The merger not only introduced a new single insurer agency (the National Health Insurance Corporation),6
but also created a new insurance review agency, Health Insurance Review and Assessment (HIRA). Even
before the merger, claims were reviewed by a central agency, which was under the association of health-
insurance funds for employees. As the association of employee insurance funds was against the merger, it
suggested to the Government that the insurance system should have a separate agency for claim review and
medical assessment, independent from the new single-insurer agency.
For a long time, healthcare providers complained that claim review was frequently driven by the fiscal
concerns of the insurer. They requested that medical claims be reviewed on the basis of the appropriateness
of services rather than the fiscal concerns of the insurance system. Consequently, healthcare providers
strongly supported the idea of a separate health-insurance review agency, independent of the NHIC. 
As a result, the merger created the two aforementioned insurance agencies, instead of one. Since then, the
management of the health-insurance system has been divided between the two agencies based on functions.
The NHIC handles premium collection, fund pooling, and reimbursement to providers; and HIRA handles
purchasing such as claim review as well as the design of the benefits package and the provider payment
system. From 2011, contributions to all social security programmes (health insurance, long-term care
insurance, unemployment insurance, and workplace injury) are collected by the NHIC. HIRA plays an
important role in determining the structure of the payment system (for example, relative values of individual
services under the Resource Based Relative Value (RBRV) system of fee-for-service). However, the fee level of
the fee-for-service payment system is determined by negotiation between the NHIC and each provider
association, such as the “Korean Medical Association”, the “Korean Hospital Association”, and others. In the
case of pharmaceuticals, HIRA determines the (positive) listing of new medicines based on economic
evaluation (cost-effectiveness). The NHIC and the pharmaceutical manufacturer then negotiate on the
reimbursement price of medicines. 
The establishment of two separate agencies has resulted in some duplication of functions. For benefit-
package decisions, technical input is provided by committees in HIRA, which may not pay enough attention
MERGER OF STATUTORY HEALTH-INSURANCE
FUNDS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
4
6 Its name has recently been changed to the National Health Insurance Service (NHIS).
13
RE
PU
BL
IC
 O
F 
KO
RE
A.
 M
ER
GE
R 
OF
 S
TA
TU
TO
RY
 H
EA
LT
H 
IN
SU
RA
NC
E 
FU
ND
S
to fiscal implications. However, there can also be some positive effects of the division of one insurance
agency into two. The system of two different agencies may mitigate the potentially inefficient bureaucracy
(such as lack of responsiveness) of the large single insurer organization. 
The relationship between the NHIC and HIRA is heavily influenced by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. The
Bureau of Health Insurance in the MOHW plays a key role in the formulation of the health-insurance policy
which is implemented by the NHIC and HIRA. The authoritative monitoring power of the MOHW derives
from its role in approving the budget of the insurance agencies. The MOHW also influences the appointment
of the key top-level officers in the insurance agencies.
4.3 Health insurance policy-making
In the single-insurer system following the merger, major decisions on health insurance – such as contributions
and benefits coverage – became a national agenda item which required a new policy framework. The
emergence of the single insurer brought the previously fragmented health insurance issues into the national
policy arena. After experiencing a large financial deficit in 2001 (as a result of a fee increase following
pharmaceutical reform), the health-insurance system introduced the Health Insurance Policy (Deliberation)
Committee, which approves major decisions on health insurance such as contribution rates, benefit packages,
and pricing. 
The NHIC and HIRA provide technical input and evidence to the Health Insurance Policy Committee. The
Committee has 25 members, with the Vice-Minister of Health and Welfare as the chair. It is a tripartite
committee of payers, providers, and experts/public agencies. Membership is designated to representative
organizations. Eight members are from payers (labour unions, employer associations, civic groups, patients
groups, and the like), eight from providers (associations of physicians, hospitals, dentists, pharmacists, nurses,
traditional physicians, and so on), and eight representing public interests (the MOHW, the Ministry of Planning
and Finance, the NHIS, HIRA, and four experts). 
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5.1 Efficiency
The single-insurer system following the merger was expected to reduce the administrative costs of national
health insurance due to economy of scale in management. Following the merger of self-employed health
insurance and the Government and school employees’ health insurance in 1998, 227 insurance funds of the
former and 19 offices of the latter were reduced to 162 regional offices, and their manpower from 10 849 to
9073 persons as of December 1999 (NHIC, 2000). 
However, there may exist an optimal size for the insurance fund, beyond which it may suffer from managerial
inefficiency and a lack of responsiveness to consumer needs. If the primary objective of the merger is to
reduce administrative costs, then merger into a few larger insurance funds rather than into a single one may
also be an alternative. In reality, the comprehensive restructuring of the national health-insurance system
faced strong resistance from the labour unions and fell short of the original goal of downsizing. There was a
sharp decrease in the proportion of administrative costs in 2001 (immediately following the merger) although
it had been declining since 1998 (Table 3). It is clear that the merger of statutory health-insurance funds has
had a positive effect on the efficiency of the health insurance system of the Republic of Korea by reducing the
share of administrative costs in total health-insurance expenditure.
IMPACTS OF THE MERGER OF STATUTORY
HEALTH-INSURANCE FUNDS IN THE REPUBLIC
OF KOREA
5
Table 3. Proportion of administrative costs of the health insurance system (1996–2008)
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2008
Total 6 379 7 555 8 701 9 610 10 744 14 108 14 798 15 972 17 330 19 980 22 818 28 273
Expenditure
Administrative 502 618 639 571 696 629 598 634 693 759 779 672
Costs
Proportion 7.87% 8.18% 7.34% 5.94% 6.48% 4.46% 4.04% 3.97% 4.00% 3.80% 3.41% 2.38%
of Administrative 
Costs
Source: Health Insurance Statistics, 2012.
The single insurer would have greater bargaining power as a monopoly purchaser (a monopsony), relative to
healthcare providers. However, it was not clear whether the new single insurer had the strong incentive and
willingness to exercise its purchasing power. Even before the merger, the health-insurance system in the
Republic of Korea had, in essence, a single/pooled purchasing system because there was no competition
among funds to attract the insured, and healthcare providers were subject to a uniform payment system
(regulated fee-for-service) and centralized claim review. A performance evaluation system would be
important to provide an incentive for the monopolist insurer to improve its efficiency in operation. 
The opponents of the merger maintained that it would result in a moral hazard for the insured as well as for
workers in insurance funds (Lee, 2012). Before the merger, each insurance fund was responsible for its fiscal
performance, and the insured would be keen to enhance the financial status of their own fund (for example,
through a feeling of ownership). After the merger, the insured may be less concerned about the financial
status of health insurance (because it is now a nationwide pool), and healthcare utilization may rise. At the
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same time, collection of contributions for self-employed health insurance may be less active after the merger.
However, it is extremely difficult to verify empirically if and to what extent the merger itself had an impact on
healthcare utilization and expenditure.
National health insurance experienced a fiscal crisis when the accumulated surpluses were depleted in 2001.
The opponents of the merger argued that moral hazard and inflexibility in raising contributions after the
merger (because a nationwide contribution rate was established) contributed to the fiscal crisis. However, the
annual fiscal deficit had already begun in 1997, and the sudden increase in physicians’ fees by 45% after the
physician strikes against pharmaceutical reform (separation of prescribing and dispensing) was the major
contributing factor to the fiscal crisis (Kwon, 2007). 
5.2 Equity
Only a limited amount of empirical research has examined the impact of the merger on equity in
contributions. Based on data from one province, Park & Park (2001) showed that equity in health-insurance
contributions improved among the self-employed after the merger. The NHIC showed that the merger
increased equity in contributions to health insurance for the self-employed, thanks to a uniform nationwide
contribution formula. According to the NHIC (2000), 62.2% of households nationwide experienced a
decrease in monthly contributions (by 4574 Won, or US$ 4, on average) compared with the pre-merger level,
and 37.8% of them experienced an increase in contributions (by 6749 Won, on average).7
The merger also improved equity in contributions among employees. Immediately following the merger,
56.6% of employees experienced a decrease in contributions (NHIC, 2000). Those insured who earned more
than 1 540 000 Won per month experienced an increase in contributions, and the greater their income the
greater the amount of the increase (Table 4). The change in the contribution also depended on the size of the
employer. Workers in small firms with fewer than 10 employees enjoyed a 17% decrease in contributions,
while the contribution of employees in large corporations with more than 1000 employees increased by
19.4% (Table 5).
Standardized monthly income: Rate of change in Average amount of change
contribution base (10 000 Won) contribution (%) in monthly contribution (Won)
-52 -41.0 -7 934
52-75 -24.2 -5 588
75-100 -17.6 -5 082
100 -126 -11.5 -3 999
126-154 -6.1 -2 492
154-199 3.0 1 371
199-249 9.6 5 311
249-303 15.9 10 232
303- 33.9 29 455
This table is from Kwon, 2003a, p.82.
Source: National Health Insurance Corporation, Internal Report, 2000. 
Table 4. Effect of the new (uniform) contribution schedule upon contributions to employee
health insurance (simulation results), 2000 
7 US$ 1 is equivalent to 1000 –1100 Won (of the Republic of Korea).
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Contribution Change
Number Contribution Old New Amount Rate of 
of firms (%) base of change change %
Total 170 169
(100.0) 1 467 074 40 132 40 132
Small-sized Subtotal 145 302
firms (85.4)
-10 employees 89 082 1 191 643 39 193 32 531 -6 662 -17.0
11~30 employees 56 220 1 182 092 38 515 32 270 -6 245 -16.2
Medium-sized Subtotal 23 253
firms (13.7)
31~100 employees 18 221 1 207 162 37 046 32 955 -4 091 -11.0
101~300 employees 5032 1 291 921 36 535 35 269 -1 266 -3.5
Large firms Subtotal 1614
(0.9)
301~500 employees 757 1 539 102 38 835 42 017 3 182 8.2
501~1000 employees 482 1 650 426 41 446 45 056 3 610 8.7
1001- employees 375 2 025 506 46 303 55 295 8 992 19.4
This table is from Kwon 2003a, p.83. Units are in Won (of the Republic of Korea).
Source: National Health Insurance Corporation, Internal Report, 2000.
Table 5. Effect of the new (uniform) contribution schedule on monthly contributions 
to employee health insurance by firm size (simulation results), 2000 
The Kakwani index is frequently used to measure the progressivity of payments such as tax and health
insurance contributions (O’Donnell, van Doorslaer et al., 2008). The greater the Kakwani index, the greater
the progressivity of payment, that is, the rich pay more than the poor, which has a positive impact on income
redistribution. 
Yang, Kwon et al. (2003) show that payment of health-insurance contributions in 1996–2000 was regressive
(with minus Kakwani index value), but the degree of regressivity decreased over the years. Choi (2012) shows
that in 2006–2010, payment of health-insurance contributions was still regressive but less so than in the pre-
merger years (Table 6). 
These studies suggest that the merger has had a positive impact on equity in premum contributions although
there are potentially other factors that affect progressivity. According to Choi (2012), health-insurance
contributions of the self-employed are more regressive than those of employees (with the exception of
2008) – probably because it is more difficult to assess the ability to pay of the self-employed compared with
employees.
17
RE
PU
BL
IC
 O
F 
KO
RE
A.
 M
ER
GE
R 
OF
 S
TA
TU
TO
RY
 H
EA
LT
H 
IN
SU
RA
NC
E 
FU
ND
S
Table 6. Trends in the Kakwani Index
Year General taxes Social insurance
1996 0.11200 -0.21660
1997 0.11530 -0.22980
1998 0.13650 -0.21210
1999 0.14410 -0.18400
2000 0.15590 -0.16340
2006 Employees 0.13846 -0.00074
Self-employed 0.06665 -0.01741
2007 Employees 0.16250 -0.01259
Self-employed 0.04421 -0.01845
2008 Employees 0.14840 -0.01530
Self-employed 0.02941 -0.01483
2009 Employees 0.15387 -0.01131
Self-employed 0.01878 -0.02219
2010 Employees 0.15986 -0.00828
Self-employed 0.03528 -0.03373
Sources: Yang, Kwon, Lee et al., 2003 (Kakwani index from 1996–2000); Choi, 2012 (Kakwani index from 2006–2010).
Both studies used household survey data from the National Statistical Office.
For equity in contribution payment, the health-insurance system should overcome the critical barrier
associated with the difficulty of income assessment of the self-employed, which will also affect the tax
system and other social insurance such as the national pension. Even the single insurer currently has two
different contribution formulae, for employees and the self-employed. Employee contributions are based on
wage income only, while self-employed contributions consider both income and assets (such as a house and
automobile). In that sense, equity across employees and the self-employed may not be fully achieved after
the merger.
The concept of taking into account flow (income) and stock (assets) together in the contribution formula has
been controversial and caused many appeals by the self-employed. Furthermore, increasing contributions in
order to expand benefit coverage and financial protection, which has been a major task for national health
insurance in the Republic of Korea, would face tougher resistance unless equity in contribution improved. 
But inequity in contribution also arises in the employee group, as their contribution does not take into
account non-wage income. Recently, the Government has been considering the introduction of a uniform
contribution schedule, based upon all types of income – although it may face some political barriers to this
policy change. Income in the current contribution formula for employees considers only wage (or business)
income, but not other types of income such as investment income, rental income, and so on. The current
contribution schedule is inefficient (as it distorts labour participation) and inequitable (as it treats various
types of income differently or allows favourable treatment of those who have high non-wage income and
penalizes those who have wage-income only). 
5.3 Purchasing
In the 2000s, national health-insurance benefits coverage was substantially expanded. Additional benefits
included covering screening programmes for five cancers, reducing the coinsurance rate for catastrophic
conditions, introducing six-month ceilings for cumulative out-of-pocket payments for covered services, and
so on. Savings in the administrative expenses involved in national health insurance after the merger seemed
to contribute to the fiscal space available for benefits expansion. Since the emergence of the single insurance
agency, national health insurance became a major policy issue for politicians and the central Government.
The Government seemed to be more responsive to the need for enhanced financial protection through
expanding benefits coverage. 
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Merger into a single large insurance agency also contributed to the improved capacity of the NHIS agency as
purchaser. In 2006, the NHIS introduced the policy of positive listing of medicines based on economic
evaluation (health technology assessment). If a pharmaceutical manufacturer wants its product to be
included in the benefits package, it must submit evidence of its cost-effectiveness, which is reviewed by
Health Insurance Review and Assessment. Once it is decided that the product is to be included in the
reimbursement list, then the NHIS negotiates the price with the manufacturer. The technical and bargaining
capacity of the insurer with respect to pharmaceuticals has rapidly improved.
However, the single insurer still does not fully exercise its monopsonistic bargaining power. Health insurance
pays medical providers via fee-for-service, and payment reform towards a prospective payment system has
faced opposition by healthcare providers (Kwon, 2003d). In the healthcare system of the Republic of Korea,
where more than 90% of hospitals are private, the threat of a strike by physicians deters the insurer from
using its financial leverage as a single payer. The nationwide physician strikes against pharmaceutical reform
in 2000 seem to have left a long-lasting scar on policy-makers and the insurer. The financial sustainability and
the efficiency of the health-insurance system of the Republic of Korea will hinge upon its capacity and
willingness to effectively use its purchasing power over providers and implement payment systems such as
capitation, the DRG-based prospective payment system, and global budgeting (Kwon, 2009). 
Furthermore, the Republic of Korea still has a mandate for healthcare providers to participate in the health-
insurance system. However, the Republic of Korea should now reconsider the contractual relationship
between the insurer and medical providers. At present, the Republic of Korea does not need to require all
medical providers to join the health-insurance system, as it has a sufficient supply of providers who cannot
survive without participating in the health-insurance programme (in the system of universal population
coverage). To the contrary, the mandate on providers is a barrier to the exercise of monopolistic purchasing
power by the single insurer, because it cannot selectively contract with providers based on their performance.
Selective contracting faces opposition from the Medical Association. Civic groups are also opposed to
selective contracting, concerned that some leading hospitals may not want to join the national health-
insurance system. 
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Health policy and reform cannot be simply transplanted from one country to others. Healthcare financing
reform, such as the merger of insurance funds in the Republic of Korea, needs to be contextualized in terms of
policy design and implementation strategy, taking into account the health-financing systems of low-income
and middle-income countries. For example, health-insurance development in the Republic of Korea was
Government-driven from design to implementation, which has resulted in minimum differences across
insurance funds. Rapid extension of population coverage and a relatively short history have contributed to
the merger, as the vested interests associated with different schemes were not yet powerful before the
merger. To some extent, health insurance based on multiple funds contributed to the rapid extension of
population coverage, taking into account the characteristics of different groups among the insured. However,
the fragmented system faced a problem of inefficient risk-pooling and fiscal unsustainability of self-employed
funds in rural areas, and the difference in fiscal capacity among funds threatened social solidarity.
In general, the single insurance system is efficient because it has a greater risk-pooling capacity and can better
use its financial leverage in bargaining with providers (Kwon, 2011). It is equitable, as everybody can access
the same benefits with the same contribution mechanism. However, efficiency can be achieved not necessarily
by a single insurer but also by reasonably large insurers, say, those based upon regions. After a certain
threshold, increasing the size of the insurance pool may have a marginal effect on the increase in risk-pooling
and the bargaining capacity of the insurer. 
Equity can also be achieved by uniform benefit packages, contribution setting, and a provider-payment system
across insurance funds (as, for example, in Japan), although it requires a strong role of government. Therefore
low-income and middle-income countries should consider their own contexts, including their government’s
capacity to regulate/harmonize insurance funds, in any decision to move towards a single insurance system or
a system involving a few well-harmonized (regulated) insurers. The culture and history of decentralization or
local autonomy also needs to be considered.
With the same benefits package and provider-payment, multiple insurance funds can function as a single
purchaser. However, when tax financing is not pooled with health-insurance financing, and direct budget
financing still accounts for a significant share of (public) hospital financing, then the purchasing function will
be fragmented and inefficient (as in many formerly planned economies). In that case, although health
insurance has a single fund, healthcare financing through public funds (tax and social health insurance) has
limited purchasing power.
The single insurer system can enjoy economies of scale in management and save administrative costs.
However, a large organization with a monopolistic position may involve the risk of bureaucratic inefficiency.
Therefore, low-income and middle-income countries should take into account the culture of bureaucracy,
and should introduce an efficient management or performance-evaluation system for the insurer
organization.
Healthcare financing and reform are inherently political, involving vested interest groups. For example,
enrollees in insurance funds with generous benefits coverage will oppose the merger of funds toward a
single-insurer system. Political leadership, policy process, and the strategies of political actors will be crucial
in the success or failure of health-financing reform. In the case of the Republic of Korea, progressive civic
LESSONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
6
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groups had a coalition with the new President and positioned health-insurance reform as a social movement
towards welfare expansion. Change in the policy process from an authoritarian, elite-led, top-down approach
to a democratic, participatory, bottom-up approach contributed to the success of healthcare reform (Kwon
& Reich, 2005). If policy change towards a single insurer system involves heavy opposition from stakeholders,
the political cost of reform will be very high. Policy-makers should evaluate and compare the benefits of
reform with potential political costs. Comprehensive change and incremental change (for example, merging
into larger funds with the goal of a single fund in the long term) may have varying political costs.
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In the introduction and extension of health insurance in the Republic of Korea, the pluralistic approach of
multiple insurance funds was in the interest of the Government in terms of political considerations and
economic constraints. Although it was useful for incremental extension, the health-insurance system based
on fragmented insurance funds was vulnerable to fiscal instability, and the differential financial capacity
among funds harmed social solidarity. Fiscal instability was more likely as insurance funds were too small to
have efficient risk-pooling capacity. Accordingly, a merger among insurance funds became inevitable,
although whether merger should result in a single insurer or a small number of large insurers is a difficult
choice. 
Major driving forces behind the merger of statutory health-insurance funds in the Republic of Korea included
inequity in paying for health insurance and the fiscal insolvency of many health-insurance funds for the self-
employed in rural areas. The new President, with a keen interest in social-policy reform opened a policy
window for healthcare-financing reform. Long-time supporters of structural change in the health-insurance
system took advantage of opportunities for policy change provided in the political arena. For example,
labour unions and progressive civic groups played an important role in health-insurance reform.
Compared with the system of multiple insurance funds, the single-insurer system can be more equitable and
efficient in terms of administrative cost, risk-pooling, and purchasing power. As health-financing reform is
political, each country should consider its own political and economic context in any discussion about
institutional arrangements for health insurance (multiple funds or single insurer). Countries should also
carefully design their political strategy to reach their final goal. If incremental change is considered a more
viable option with less political cost, reform could begin with harmonizing benefit packages, setting
contributions, and establishing provider-payment systems across insurance funds, in order to move towards
single purchasing and improvement in the efficiency of the health insurance system.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
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ANNEX
Economic and health indicators in the Republic of Korea, 1977–2008
1977 1989 2000 2008
GDP per capita (in USD)a 1 042 5 430 11 347 20 591 (2010)
Life expectancyb 64.8 71 76 79.9
Mortality (per 100 000 persons)c 690 542.3 497.3 (2009)
Infant mortality (per 1000 births)b,c 38 12 5.8 3.5
(average over (average over
1970-1975) 1999-2002)
Number of physicians (per 10 000 persons)b 5 (1981) 8 13 19 (2009)
Number of beds (per 10 000 persons)b 17 (1981) 23 47 78
Number of physician visits per capitab 3.7 6.2 10.6 (2002) 13
Number of admissions per capitac -0.06 (1990) - 0.13
Number of hospital days per admissionb,c 12 13.6 13.8 (2002) 14.6 (2009)
Note: 1977 marked the introduction of health insurance; 
1989 marked the onset of universal coverage.
Sources: a Bank of the Republic of Korea (2011); b OECD (2010); c Republic of Korea, NSO (2011).
23
RE
PU
BL
IC
 O
F 
KO
RE
A.
 M
ER
GE
R 
OF
 S
TA
TU
TO
RY
 H
EA
LT
H 
IN
SU
RA
NC
E 
FU
ND
S
Choi J (2012). Equity in the health care financing and payment. The Korean Journal of Health Economics and
Policy. 18(1):49–66 (in Korean).
Kim Y (1989). Development of health insurance in Korea. In: Health and Society Council, editors. Social
security for health care in Korea: for the movement toward the people’s right to health care. Seoul, Republic
of Korea: Health and Society Council; 99–120 (in Korean).
Kwon S (2001). Economic crisis and social policy reform in Korea. International Journal of Social Welfare.
10(2):97–106.
Kwon S (2003a). Health care financing reform and the new single payer system in Korea: social solidarity or
efficiency? International Social Security Review. 56(1):75–94. 
Kwon S (2003b). Pharmaceutical reform and physician strikes: separation of drug prescribing and dispensing in
Korea. Social Science and Medicine. 57(3):529–538.
Kwon S (2003c). Payment system reform for health care providers in Korea. Health Policy and Planning.
18(1):84–93.
Kwon S, Reich M (2005). The changing process and politics of health policy in Korea. Journal of Health
Politics, Policy and Law. 30(6):1003–1026.
Kwon S (2007). Fiscal crisis of the national health insurance in Korea: in search of a new paradigm. Social
Policy and Administration. 41(2):162–178.
Kwon S, Holliday I (2007). The Korean welfare state: a paradox of expansion in an era of globalization and
economic crisis? International Journal of Social Welfare. 16(3):242–248.
Kwon S (2009). Thirty years of national health insurance in South Korea: lessons for achieving universal
health care coverage. Health Policy and Planning. 24(1):63–71.
Kwon S (2011). Health care financing in Asia: key issues and challenges. Asia-Pacific Journal of Public Health.
23(5):651–661.
Lee K (2012). Merge of Health Insurance Funds. Republic of Korea: Gye-Chuk Publishing.
Ministry of Health and Welfare (1999). Internal report (in Korean). Seoul, Republic of Korea: Ministry of
Health and Welfare.
National Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC) (1998, 1999, 2000). Internal reports (in Korean). Seoul,
Republic of Korea: National Health Insurance Corporation.
National Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC) (Various Years). Health insurance statistics (in Korean). Seoul,
Republic of Korea: National Health Insurance Corporation.
O’Donnell O, van Doorslaer E, Rannan-Eliya R, Somanathan A et al. (2008). Who pays for health care in
Asia? Journal of Health Economics. 27(2):460–475.
Park JY, Park JW (2001). Comparison of the effect of income-redistribution before and after the merger of
medical insurance program for the self employed. Korean Journal of Health Policy and Administration.
11(2):85–122 (in Korean).
Yang B, Kwon S, Lee T, Oh J, Lee S (2003). Equity in health care financing in Korea. Korean Health Economic
Review. 9(2):1–12 (in Korean).
REFERENCES
WE ARE ALSO PROUD TO HOST THE SECRETARIATS FOR: 
In an increasingly interconnected world, we know that we achieve more when we work with others.
Recent collaborations include: Abt Associates Inc.; Australian Agency For International Development (AusAID); Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation; European Commission – Europeaid Cooperation Office (AIDCO); France, Ministry Of Foreign And
European Affairs; Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI); Germany, Deutsche Gesellschaft Für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) Gmbh; Global Fund To Fight Aids, Tuberculosis And Malaria (GFATM); Luxembourg Development
Cooperation; Netherlands, Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport; Norwegian Agency For Development Cooperation
(NORAD); Republic of Korea, Ministry of Health and Welfare; Republic of Korea, National Health Insurance Service (NHIS);
Rockefeller Foundation; Susan G. Komen Breast Cancer Foundation Inc.; Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and
Development (AECID); Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA); United Kingdom-Department For
International Development (DFID); United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); United States Agency For International
Development (USAID).
And we are proud to be part of the Providing for Health Initiative (P4H) and to co-host the secretariat for International
Health Partnerships (IHP+).
Work with us so we can support countries to reach our shared objective: 
country health governance and financing systems that ensure universal and sustainable coverage.
Health System 
Governance, Policy and Aid
Effectiveness (HGS)
Health Financing 
Policy (HFP)
Cost Effectiveness,
Expenditure and Priority
Setting (CEP)
For additional information, please contact:
Department of Health Systems Governance and Financing
Health Systems and Innovation
World Health Organization
Email Website
hgfdepartment@who.int www.who.int/topics/health_systems/en/
